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Abstract
This paper takes a new look at the e⁄ects of mergers on innova-
tion by analysing the relationship between ex-ante technological (and
product) relatedness of acquirers and targets and post-merger per-
formances. The analysis is conducted using data on consolidations
in the pharmaceutical industry for the period 1988-2004. Empirical
results show that merger deals are more likely to be signed between
￿rms with related technologies and drug portfolio. I ￿nd that merged
companies have on average, worst performances than the group of
non-merging ￿rms and that, contrary to what may be the common
wisdom, higher levels of technological relatedness are associated with
poorer performances. Finally, consolidations between large pharma-
ceutical companies seem to have a detrimental impact on the incen-
tives of competitors to undertake research in those therapeutic areas
where both acquirer and target are active players.
JEL classi￿cation: L66, O31, O32.
Keywords: M&A, innovation, product relatedness, technological
relatedness.
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11 Introduction
According to Brealy and Myers (2003), merger waves are one of the ten un-
solved puzzles in economics and ￿nance. At present, there is not an accepted
theory that can simultaneously explain why ￿rms merge, what are the char-
acteristics of merging ￿rms and, more importantly, what are the e⁄ects of
these operations on ￿rms￿performance. At the same time, empirical works
on these issues have been quite inconclusive in explaining the drivers and the
e⁄ects of the merger waves of the last decades. Mueller (1996) and Andrade,
Mitchel and Stanford (2001) provide an excellent summary of the existing
literature.
Among the many limitations of these empirical works, three are worth to
point out. First, recent ￿ndings show the existence of industry clustering in
merger activity (Andrade, Mitchel and Stanford, 2001). This suggests that
the use of cross-industry data might be responsible for the inconclusiveness
of previous studies and calls for an analysis that is based on a well-de￿ned
industry. Second, although there is a vast literature studying the short-run
e⁄ects of M&As on ￿rms￿prices, pro￿ts and market value, little attention
has been devoted to the long-run assessment of dynamic e¢ ciency. The
traditional static analysis of the e⁄ects of mergers on ￿rms￿market power
and e¢ ciency shows some important limitations when applied to those R&D
intensive industries where both margins and costs are largely determined by
innovation. Finally, there has been little e⁄ort to link the ex-post e⁄ects of
mergers to the ex-ante observable characteristics of merging ￿rms. But it
is likely that the degree of successful of a merger depends largely on these
2characteristics.
This study takes a new approach to the study of mergers that tries to
overcome these limitations. To my data set, whose structure is brie￿ y illus-
trated next and then detailed in Section 3, I ask the following two questions:
i) What are the e⁄ects of mergers on the long-run performance of ￿rms? In
particular: Do they have a positive e⁄ect on the innovative ability of the
￿rms involved, as their proponents often claim?1 And do they have any
relevant impact on the innovation e⁄orts of competing ￿rms? ii) Is there
any relationship between the ex-ante technological and product relatedness
of merging parties and the ex-post e⁄ects of the mergers?
The analysis is conducted for the case of the Pharmaceutical Industry
for the period 1988-2004 and it is con￿ned to M&As among the largest drug
makers. There are di⁄erent reasons that justify the choice of the pharma-
ceutical industry. First, pharmaceutical ￿rms have played a prominent role
in the wave of international M&As, accounting for some of the largest merg-
ers of the last decade.2 Second, this is one of the sectors with the highest
intensity in R&D and innovation is clearly the most important dimension
of competition among ￿rms. At the same time, the analysis is restricted
to the mergers between the largest drug companies because these are the
only transactions that can both in￿ uence the incentives and abilities of the
merged entities and reshape the structure of the industry, at least for some of
its therapeutic areas. Needless to say that mergers between large companies
1As suggested by Lawrence White (1987, p. 18) ￿E¢ ciencies are easy to promise, yet
may be di¢ cult to deliver￿ .
2Examples include Glaxo-Smithkline and P￿zer-Pharmacia Corp., until the recent ac-
quisition of Aventis by Sano￿-Synthelabo.
3are the operations more likely to rise anticompetitive concerns.
The dataset used gathers di⁄erent sources of information. First, ￿nancial
data for large pharmaceutical ￿rms (SIC code 2834 and 2835) are retrieved
from the Standard & Poor￿ s Compustat and the Bureau van Dijk￿ s Osiris.
This set of data is matched with the patent statistics of the NBER Patent
data, that comprise detailed information on all US patents granted between
1963 to 2002. Information on the drugs produced by the pharmaceutical ￿rms
are retrieved from the British National Formulary and the Orange Book of
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Finally, merger transactions data
for the period 1988-2004 are extracted from the Mergers Year Book. All these
di⁄erent pieces of information have been cross-checked with several sources
available on the internet.
This study shows that merger deals are more likely to be signed between
companies with related technologies and drug portfolio. Results obtained
suggest that mergers do not seem to deliver any important e¢ ciency gain to
the ￿rms involved. On average, merged companies are found to have worst
innovation performances than the group of non-merging ￿rms. But as there
is no such a thing as an ￿average merger￿ , this paper advances our under-
standing of the e⁄ects of mergers by analysing the relationship between ex-
ante similarities of acquirers and targets and the post-merger performance.
Indeed, the paper shows that, contrary to what may be the common wis-
dom, higher levels of technological relatedness are associated with poorer
performances. Finally, consolidations between large pharmaceutical compa-
nies seem to have a detrimental impact on the incentives of competitors to
undertake research in those therapeutic areas where both acquirer and target
4are active players.
This study is close to the papers by Danzon, Epstein and Nicholson
(2004), Ahuja and Katila (2001) and Cassiman, Colombo, Garrone and
Veugelers (2004).3 Danzon et al. (2004) examines the determinants of M&A
in the pharmaceutical and biotech industry and, in turn, their e⁄ects on
￿rms￿performance. For large ￿rms, they ￿nd that mergers are a response to
excess capacity due to anticipated patent expirations and gaps in the com-
pany￿ s product pipeline. In contrast with the results of this paper, they ￿nd
that large ￿rms that merged experience similar changes in enterprise value,
sales, employees and R&D relative to similar ￿rms that did not merge. The
paper by Cassiman et al. (2004) show that the impact of M&As on R&D
and innovation depends on the technological and market relatedness of ac-
quirers and targets. They ￿nd that R&D level increases (decreases) when the
ex-ante technology of the merged entities are complementary (substitutive).
At the same time, there seem to be a more prominent increase in research
e¢ ciency when the merged parties have complementary technology.4 Finally,
Ahuja and Katila (2001) analyse the e⁄ects of mergers on the acquirers￿per-
formance, as measured through the number of patents obtained after the
merger, in the chemicals industry. They construct a measure of technolog-
ical relatedness based on the number of common patent citation made by
the merging entities. They ￿nd signi￿cant evidence of a non-linear impact of
relatedness on innovation output, where both too close and too distant cases
3Katz and Shelanski (2004) present an exhaustive discussion of the challenges that
innovation poses to antitrust policy, with particular attention to the ways that innovation
may factor into merger analysis.
4The paper by Cassiman et al (2004) also gives an exhaustive survey of the existing
literature on the impact of M&As on R&D.
5have detrimental e⁄ects.
Compared to the studies above, this paper di⁄ers in several important
ways. First, the analysis builds on the main insights into the forces that
drive the dynamics of R&D investment decisions provided by industrial or-
ganization literature. Interpretation of some empirical ￿ndings is di¢ cult
without a proper understanding of these forces. Second, I analyse the ef-
fects of mergers on di⁄erent dimensions of innovation activities: inputs and
outputs, as measured through R&D expenditure and number of patents, re-
spectively, as well as research productivity, captured by the ratio of patents
to R&D expenditure. As the e⁄ects of innovation are likely to materialise
over a number of years, rather than entirely in any one year, the empiri-
cal speci￿cation measures the impact of acquisitions up to 3 years after the
transactions. Moreover, the relationship between ex-post e⁄ects and ex-ante
similarities between acquirers and targets is explored by computing di⁄erent
highly detailed measures of relatedness, both for technology and products
portfolio. Finally, this paper tries also to extend the analysis of the e⁄ects of
M&As on the innovation incentives of competing drug makers. By reinforcing
the position of acquirers in some therapeutic ￿elds, mergers might reduce the
incentives of the other participants to actively compete in innovation races.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
underpinnings of our research questions together with the empirical method-
ology used to investigate these questions. Section 3 presents the data set
and variables used, with particular emphasis on the construction of patent
statistics from the original raw data. Empirical results are summarized in
Section 4. Section 5 presents some concluding remarks, pointing also to the
6policy implications of the results obtained.
2 Methodology
2.1 Theoretical Analysis
This section aims at exploring whether mergers among companies with simi-
lar characteristics are more likely and to what extent these operations e⁄ect
the ￿rms￿ex-post innovation outcomes. As anticipated above, this paper does
not treat these two issues as separate questions but try to explore possible
links between post-merger research performance and the ex-ante character-
istics of the two merging partners. Although I do not directly address the
question of why ￿rms decide to merge, the ￿ndings of this paper also shed
some light on this issue.
a) Choice of a merging partner
The seminal paper of Becker (1973) about marriage provides a sound
theoretical framework to show why ￿positive assortive mating - a positive
correlation between the values of the traits of husband and wives - is generally
optimal￿ . At the same time, there are several evidences in social science
literature that mating of likes (whether measures by intelligence, age, skin
colour, religion or other traits) is very common. But surprisingly enough,
empirical evidences on the importance of complementarity among merged
￿rms￿characteristics are rather scarce.
In this section, I de￿ne a simple theoretical framework to explain why
managers might favour mergers between ￿rms with similar technology and
7products. To this purpose, let assume that the market value of a pharma-
ceutical company, V i; depends both on the revenues from the portfolio of
the m-drugs already sold in the market, Rm; and the expected revenues from
the k-compounds that are still under investigation in its laboratories, Rk.
Accordingly, it can be written that:
Vi = v
￿
R
m
i ;R
k
i
￿
(1)
Revenues Rm are assumed to be net of manufacturing and advertising costs
while Rk are net of research costs.
Cutting of cost and adding marketed products to improve capacity uti-
lization are generally considered the main drivers of mergers in the pharma-
ceutical industry (Ravenscraft and Long, 2000). Any merger between big
pharmaceutical companies implies a reinforcement of their drug portfolio.
But deals between ￿rms with high product relatedness, PR, might increase
their market power and in turn, revenues Rm. At the same time, a signi￿cant
overlapping in the marketed drugs allows to achieve larger economies of scale
in production and advertising, with again an increase of the net revenues
Rm. It can be then assumed that @Vi=@PR > 0. Using a parallel argument,
one can assume that there is a positive relationship between technological
relatedness, TR, and market value, i.e. @Vi=@TR > 0, because of possible
economies of scale in research and less competition in the innovation market
(both of which increase the expected revenues Rk).
The discussion above suggests that managers might anticipate (correctly
or not) that mergers between companies with high relatedness in products
and research projects are optimal. Using Becker￿ s terminology, hereafter I
8will refer to this hypothesis as ￿positive assortive merging￿ . The section
below shows that the complexity of the research activity is such that it is
di¢ cult to anticipate the true relationship between technological relatedness
and innovation outcomes and in turn, ￿rms￿value.
b) E⁄ects of mergers on innovation
The aim of this section is to highlight the channel through which mergers
can a⁄ect the optimal level of R&D expenditures and the consequent inno-
vation performance. In the second part, the analysis is extended to consider
the role of ￿technological relatedness￿and ￿product relatedness￿ .
The research process of pharmaceutical ￿rms can be divided into two
main phases: discovery and development. The discovery phase is aimed
at detecting new compounds, also known as new chemical entities (NCEs).
Once a new promising compound is found, ￿rms apply for a patent to assure
themselves the right of exploiting any potential economic return from the
discovery. The second phase consists in a series of pre-clinical and clinical
development work to test the safety and e¢ cacy of the NCEs, before obtain-
ing marketing approval.5 Because of the nature of my data set (i.e. patent
data), this paper is mainly concerned with the e⁄ects of M&As on the dis-
covery of NCEs. Nevertheless, the empirical ￿ndings of Section 4 give some
interesting insights on the causal e⁄ect of mergers on the overall innovation
5Failure rates during development are very high: for each new compound that is ￿-
nally approved, roughly ￿ve enter human clinical trials and 250 enter pre-clinical testing
(Danzon, Nicholson and Pereira, 2003). The time that is usually necessary to take a new
compound through development and regulatory approval is about 8 years. This means
that on average ￿rms can bene￿t from patent protection on drugs approved only for 10
years. See Henderson and Cockburn (1996) for a detailed description of research and
development of compounds.
9activity.
The inputs in the discovery activity include the variable cost of funding
di⁄erent research projects, R&D, as well as a certain exogenous amount of
￿xed costs, F, that a ￿rm incurs independently of the number of projects
under way, e.g. lab buildings and equipments, libraries, etc. The outcome of
the discovery activity is de￿ned by the number of patent grants over newly
discovered compounds, P. This is assumed to depend on the ￿rm￿ s R&D
expenditure above the ￿xed costs, R&D, and on the level of knowledge ac-
quired by the ￿rm in that therapeutic ￿eld, Z.6 Accordingly, I assume that
the innovation function can be written as:
Pi;t = ￿i;t ￿ R&D
a
i;t ￿ Z
b
it (2)
where ￿ is a random term that models the uncertainty in the relationship
between the e⁄orts that a ￿rm makes and the actual progress towards the
discovery of a new compound. This is assumed to be drawn from a uniform
distribution [0;2&]:7
The optimal level of R&D expenditure is determined by the ￿rm solving
the maximization problem:
max
R&D
Ri(N) ￿ & ￿ R&D
a
i;t ￿ Z
b
i;t | {z }
Pi:t
￿ %(R&Di;t + Fi;t) (3)
where R refers to the average expected revenue from a patent, which is
6Note that the level of Z depends not only on the ￿rm￿ s past investments in research
activity but also on the competitors￿knowledge that spill over to the ￿rm.
7Note that, as I do not observe investments at the level of individual research projects,
the analysis refers to the set of compounds investigated by the ￿rm as a unit.
10assumed to depend, among other factors, on the number of competitors N in
the market; % is the cost of ￿nancing total research investments (R&D+F).
As external ￿nance for R&D is more expensive than internal ￿nance, it is
assumed that % = 1 if ￿rms use internal funds and % > 1 for external capital.8
Note that the random parameter ￿ has been replaced by its expected value
&. Straightforward calculation leads to the following equation:
R&D
￿
i;t =
 
a ￿ Ri(N) ￿ & ￿ Zb
i;t
%
! 1
1￿a
(4)
This equation is useful to analyse the di⁄erent channels through which
mergers can a⁄ect the optimal R&D expenditure and in turn, innovation
output. First, by unifying the expertise of the acquirer, Z￿, and the tar-
get, Z￿, mergers might create large knowledge synergies. The new company
can then rely on a knowledge base above those of the two merged entities,
Z￿+￿ > Z￿ + Z￿: According to equation (4), this would imply an increase in
the R&D expenditure and, ceteris paribus, in the innovation output. How-
ever, this argument tend to overlook that the knowledge Z is embodied in
the ￿rms￿biologists and chemists. The large reduction in the number of re-
searchers that often follows the conclusion of a merger deal can then reduce
the actual know-how of the newly formed company, i.e. Z￿+￿ < Z￿ + Z￿.9
8Hall (2002) a¢ rms that there are three main reasons why there might be a gap be-
tween the external and internal costs of capital: (i) asymmetric information problems (ii)
moral hazard problems and (iii) tax treatments of external ￿nance vs. ￿nance by retained
earnings.
9This assumption is con￿rmed by anecdotal evidence. After the merger in 1996 Glax-
oWellcome closed Wellcome￿ s main U.K. research facility in Becenham (1500 sceintists and
sta⁄). Several experts suggested that GlaxoWellcome lost more talent than they expected
(Ravenscraft and Long, 2000). Similar situation for Aventis where R&D projects were cut
and one R&D facility closed.
11Moreover, cultural dissonances and other integration problems might disrupt
innovation outcomes, therefore reducing the expected probability of success-
ful innovation below &.10
Second, mergers between large pharmaceutical companies may trigger
strategic interaction between competitors. The paper on research joint ven-
ture by Kamier, Mueller and Zang (1992) shows that the internalization of
technological out￿ ows that were previously captured by competitors leads to
an increase in R&D investments. Moreover, mergers not only implies the dis-
appearance of one competitor but they might also induce a reduction in the
R&D investments of those ￿rms that ￿nd themselves well behind the newly
formed company in the on-going patent races.11 Under this scenario, merged
companies can anticipate higher value of Ri(N) and this might amplify the
R&D expansion encouraged by the internalization of spillovers.12
Third, since part of the research expenditure consists of ￿xed costs, large
economies can be realized by spreading these expenses. Mergers might then
lead to a substantial reduction in research costs by avoiding useless duplica-
10In an interview with Financial Times, Joshua Boger, once top scientist in Merck and
then founder of Vertex Inc., a¢ rmed that ￿size is an advantage in times of stability and
a disadvantage in times of change. If you have got 7,000 to re-engineer, it￿ s much harder
than if you have￿ ve got 300. GlaxoSmithkline has 16,000￿(￿Just what the drugs indus-
try ordered￿ , Financial Times, 24thJanuary 2001). Cultural clashes are cited as one of
the main causes for the bad performance of Pharmacia, where US, Swedish and Italian
subcultures were continued after the merger. Aventis faced the challenge of integrating
German, French, and American business cultures (￿Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Sec-
tor￿ , 8thNovember 2004, Charles River Associate, p.112)
11Using a stochastic race model, Harris and Vickers (1987) show that the follower makes
less e⁄orts when the gap from the leader increases.
12Despite the theoretical appeal of patent race models, Cockburn and Henderson (1994)
￿nd that research investments are weakly correlated across ￿rms once common responses
to exogenous shocks are considered. They suggest that strategic interections is not a main
driver of the investment behaviour in the industry.
12tion (i.e. F￿+￿ < F￿ + F￿).
Finally, sizable consolidations as those considered in this study are largely
￿nanced with internal capital ￿ ows, partially diverted from the research ac-
tivity. The cost of funding research projects, %, might then increase if the
￿rms have to raise more capitals from external sources. Equation (4) shows
that this may imply a reduction in the level of R&D expenditure.
This framework suggests that it is not possible to predict the sign of the
net e⁄ect of mergers on total R&D expenditures, (R&D + F), the observed
measure of research inputs in this study. But if the e⁄ect of mergers is to
increase innovation through knowledge synergies (i.e. Z￿+￿ > Z￿ + Z￿), we
would ￿nd an increase in both the number of patents, P, and the innovation
productivity, as measured by the ratio of patents and research expenditure,
P/C(F;R&D).
Most of the changes in R&D inputs and outputs de￿ned above are driven
by forces whose magnitude depends on the ex-ante technological relatedness,
TR, and product relatedness, PR, of the merged parties. The remaining
of this section is aimed at shedding some light on these rather unexplored
issues.
First, post-merger knowledge synergies are likely to be greater when the
research activities of two ￿rms are closer, given that there are less opportu-
nities for cross-fertilization of ideas when these activities fall too far apart.
The knowledge base might then be a positive and increasing function of
technological relatedness, i.e. @Z￿+￿=@TR > 0. This implies that, ceteris
paribus, there is a positive relationship between innovation inputs/outputs
and technological relatedness. As suggested above, this line of reasoning
13can be misleading if ￿rms￿knowledge largely rests in the human capital of
their personnel. In this case, a larger overlap of research activities might im-
ply a greater scope for reduction of employees. Under this alternative view,
technological relatedness might be associated with a greater dissipation of
knowledge (i.e. @Z￿+￿=@TR < 0) and in turn, a reduction of the expected
revenues from compounds under investigation (i.e @Vi=@TR < 0) .
Second, although mergers between technological related companies can
reinforce their competitive advantage in research and development, the cre-
ation of ￿innovation monopolies￿can reduce the incentives of other compa-
nies to invest in research. We might then observe an overall reduction of the
innovation pace in some therapeutic areas. I come back to this point in the
next subsection when I present an empirical speci￿cation aimed at assessing
the impact of mergers on third parties.
Finally, the extent of technological relatedness a⁄ect the actual savings in
research ￿xed costs. For instance, companies working in similar therapeutic
areas are more likely to reunite their researchers in a single lab and divest
redundant facilities. We can than assume that overall R&D expenditures are
a decreasing function of TR.
As it is not possible to de￿ne unequivocal theoretical predictions about
the causal e⁄ect of technological relatedness on innovation activities, empiri-
cal analysis is the only way to assess the actual relationship between the two
variables in the pharmaceutical industry.
So far I have considered only the direct e⁄ect of mergers on innovation.
But we cannot ignore the possibility that these transactions will impact the
R&D activities indirectly through changes taking place in the market equi-
14libria for approved drugs. Closer product relatedness between the two ￿rms
may imply a greater market power in case of merger, at least for some ther-
apeutic areas.13 As discussed in the previous section, this must lead to an
increase in the market value of the ￿rm, i.e. @Vi=@PR > 0. But, by in-
creasing the available cash ￿ ows of the ￿rm, this can also reduce the actual
cost of funding research activities, %, and in turn, increase the R&D expen-
ditures (see equation (4) above). While it is interesting to assess the impact
of technological relatedness and product relatedness on post-merger ￿rms￿
performances, the latter is expected to play only a minor role in reshaping
innovation activities.
The theoretical analysis presented in this section suggests that there are
three empirical questions that are worth exploring. The ￿rst is whether
acquirers usually target ￿rms that are close in the space of chemical entities
and product portfolio, i.e. ￿positive assortive merging￿ . The second concerns
the post-merger performances of consolidated ￿rms compared to the other
drug companies. The third is whether technological relatedness and product
relatedness can explain post-merger di⁄erences in the performance of merged
companies.
2.2 Empirical Speci￿cations
In this section, I introduce the empirical speci￿cations that are used to as-
sess the e⁄ects of mergers on innovation, also in the light of the ex-ante
13Part of this marke power might arise from the ability of the merged companies￿sales
force to gain access to more doctors. For instance, in the Aventis merger the combination
of the marketing organisations of the companies was hoped to lead to a much stronger
presence in the United States (￿Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Sector￿ , 8thNovember
2004, Charles River Associate, p.107)
15technological and product relatedness of the merging parties
Mergers, in particular large deals as those considered in this paper, are
likely to produce their e⁄ects over a number of years, rather than entirely
in any one year. Therefore, the e⁄ects of mergers are analysed with the
following econometric approach:
￿%Yit = ￿0D0 + ￿1D1 + ￿2D2 + ￿3D3 + ￿1T + ui;t (5)
where ￿%Y indicates the percentage change (i.e. logarithmic di⁄erence) of
one of the innovation measures (e.g. R&D expenditure, number of patents,
etc.) between two consecutive years, T is a complete set of time dummies for
the period 1988-2004 and u is a random disturbance term. D0; D1, D2 and
D3 are dummy variables that take on value of 1 if the ￿rm i goes through
a merger in period t, in period t-1 (i.e. one-year ago), in t-2 or in t-3,
respectively. In this way, I can access the impact of mergers for up to 3 years
after the deal is closed.14
In addition to innovation inputs and outputs, interesting insights on the
e⁄ects of mergers can be inferred from estimating the change of V through
speci￿cation (5). The stock market value, V, can be used as overall indicator
14Note that for the merged ￿rms, the estimation of equation (5) requires that both the
acquirer and the target are recorded in the dataset. For instance, to compute correctly the
variable ￿%R&D, it is necessary to know the R&D expenditures of acquirer and target in
the year prior to the merger. This would not be necessary using the approach in Danzon
at al. (2004), where the impact of a merger is measured by considering the change in
a certain performance from t+1 to t+2 and t+2 to t+3. The main advantage of this
alternative approach is that one can rely on a larger number of observations, given that
only the records of the acquirer are needed to compute the outcome of interests. But this
approach makes the strong assumption that there are no important e⁄ects in the same
year of the merger and in the following one. For instance, if a merger takes place at the
beginning of year t, it is hard to imagine that the management will wait until the second
year to cut any duplication of R&D expenditures.
16of the e⁄ects of the mergers on the performance of these companies, including
the impact on the development of new compounds covered by patents and
the sales of approved drugs.
To assess the role of technological relatedness in reshaping the innova-
tion activities of the merged companies, the following regression model is
estimated:
￿%Yi;t = ￿0TRt￿1 + ￿1TRt￿2 + ￿2TRt￿3 + ￿3TRt￿4 + ￿1T + ui;t (6)
where TR refers to one of the measures of technological relatedness between
acquirers and targets explained in the following section. As for equation (5),
this speci￿cation allows us to study the role of similarities up to three years
after the merger. Illustrately speaking, for each merger deal signed in 1995,
the independent variable is computed using patent statistics of acquirer and
target in the year before the merger, TR1994. This is then used to assess the
impact of relatedness on the selected dependent variables, ￿%Y , in the year
of the merger (1995) and in the following 3 years (until 1998). Therefore,
TRt￿1 takes positive values for the ￿rms that sing a merger deal in year t (as
the dummy D0 takes on value 1 in period t), TRt￿2 takes positive values for
those companies that completed the deal one year ago while TRt￿4 is de￿ned
for those ￿rms that merged 3 years ago. A similar speci￿cation is used to
compare the importance of technological relatedness, TR, versus product
relatedness, PR, in a⁄ecting the research activities.
To get further evidences on the impact of M&As on the innovation abil-
ities of the ￿rms involved, I propose an alternative empirical test based on
patent citation data. If the combination of the research experience of acquir-
17ers and targets creates large knowledge synergies, their established knowl-
edge will be more e⁄ective in producing major therapeutic breakthroughs.
Given that a patent has to report citations to previous patents whenever the
innovation relies on prior technology, it is possible to test whether impor-
tant discoveries of NCE, as measured by the number of citations received
by the patents obtained after a merger,15 are actually built on the estab-
lished knowledge of acquirers and targets. Accordingly, the following Poisson
regression model can be estimated:
C￿;;j = exp(￿4D4 + ￿5D5 + ￿6D6) + uj (7)
where C refers to the number of citation received by any patent j granted
to the acquirers ￿ after the merger, while the ￿ctional variables D4; D5
and D6 take on value of 1 if patent j cites previous patents of the acquirer
(only), target (only) and both the acquirer and the target, respectively. The
existence of knowledge synergies would imply that all the ￿ coe¢ cients in
the equation above, and in particular ￿6, take positive values.
Finally, this paper advances the analysis of M&As and innovation by
exploring the e⁄ects of these operations on third parties. Models of patent
races show that a ￿rm i can be deterred from undertaking further e⁄orts in
innovation, when one of the competitors is in a position to outdo any moves
made by this ￿rm to win the race (Harris and Vickers, 1985). Merged ￿rms
are more likely to ￿leapfrog￿other competitors in those therapeutic areas
where both acquirers and targets do active research. The following Poisson
15The number of citations is the measure generally used in the literature to capture the
importance of a patent. Trajtenberg, Henderson and Ja⁄e (1997) represent one of the ￿rst
empirical examples.
18model is then speci￿ed:
Gi;j = exp(￿7D7 + ￿8D8 + ￿9D9 + ￿2G
bm
i;j ) + uj (8)
where G is the total number of citations received by patent j granted to
any pharmaceutical ￿rm i and cited by at least one of the merged parties
(acquirers or targets) while Gbm is the number of citations received by patent
j before the ￿rst merger among those considered in this study takes place.16
This variable measures the di⁄erences in forward citations received by patent
j before a deal is consumed. Finally, D7; D8 and D9 are dummy variables
that assume value 1 if patent j is cited by (only) the acquirer, (only) the
target, or both of the two, respectively. If competitors are actually deterred
from doing research only in those ￿elds where both the merged parties are
active players, we expect to ￿nd a negative value for the coe¢ cient ￿9.
3 Data and Variables
To answer all the questions of this investigation a new dataset is constructed
by gathering di⁄erent sources of information. To minimize measurement
errors, most of the data are cross-checked with information available on the
internet.
The main ￿nancial data come from Compustat and Osiris, published
by Standard and Poors and Bureau van Dijk, respectively. The variables
16For instance, suppose that patent j is granted in year 1995 and it is subsequently cited
by Zeneca and Smithkline Beecham. As Zeneca is involved in a merger in 1999, one year
before Smithkline￿ s merger (see Table 2B), Gbm refers to the number of citation received
by patent j until year 1998.
19retrieved are revenues from approved drugs, R, total R&D expenditures,
(R&D+F), and stock market value, V, for the period 1988-2004. For ease
of notation, hereafter I will refer to total research investments (including
￿xed costs) as simply R&D. All monetary values are adjusted for in￿ ation
using the US domestic manufacturing Producer Price Index (with index year
1987). The analysis is restricted to the largest pharmaceutical ￿rms, those
with a stock market value exceeding $1 billion at least once during the rel-
evant period, including also Japanese companies. For those companies with
relevant interests outside the pharmaceutical industry, such as BASF, Bayer
and Monsanto, annual reports (available on the internet) are used to ￿nd
the relevant information concerning their pharmaceutical arms. Large com-
panies specialized in the production of generic drugs (such as Ivax, Mylan or
Teva) are not included in the sample. Financial data reported in the original
Compustat and Osiris data sets are edited to consider relevant spin-o⁄s, such
as Merck￿ s divesture of the ￿pharmaceutical bene￿ts management￿company
Medco in year 2003.
Patent statistics were obtained from the publicly available NBER Patent
data, described by Trajtenberg, Ja⁄e and Hall (2001). This dataset comprises
detailed information on all US patents granted between 1963 to 2002.17 Two
di⁄erent ￿les of this patent data bank are used in this investigation: the
Patent Data ￿le and the Citation Data ￿le. The information retrieved from
the ￿rst ￿le are the patent number, the application year and the year the
patents are granted, the assignee identi￿er and the patent class and subclass.
17I thank B. Hall for providing me complementary data on patent sub-classes that are
not available in the original data bank.
20The US Patent O¢ ce has developed a highly elaborate classi￿cation system
for the technologies to which the patented inventions belong, consisting of
about 400 main patent classes, and over 120,000 patent subclasses. Following
the classi￿cation in Trajtenberg et al. (2001), our data include only patents
recorded in the technological category ￿Drugs and Medical￿ , made of 14 main
patent classes.18 The Citation Data ￿le records the citations made for each
patent granted. Given that pharmaceutical companies patent proli￿cally, the
number of patents is a rather noisy measure of research success. It is then
useful to count also the ￿important￿patents, Pimp, where the importance is
inferred by the number of citations that a patent receives. More precisely, all
the patents granted in year t are ordered by the number of citations received
and then grouped in quintiles. A patent is considered an ￿important￿patent
if it belongs to one of the top two quintiles of the citations ranking.19. Basic
statistics for the main variables used to study the e⁄ects of mergers are
reported in Table 1:
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Using the compendium of drugs published by the National British Formu-
lary and the data in the Orange Book of the FDA, together with complemen-
18This category is divided in the following sub-category: (1) Drugs: patent classes 424
and 514; (2) Surgery and Medical Instruments: 128, 600, 601, 602, 604, 606 and 607;
(3) Biotechnology: 435 and 800; (4) Miscellaneous-Drug and Medicals: 351, 433 and 623.
This makes a total of 14 patent classes.
19Results presented in the following section are robust to changes in the de￿nition of
￿important￿patent, for instance considering only patents in the top quartile in terms of
citations received. Note that this variable has not been computed for year 2001 and 2002
since the number of citations for patents of these two years is very small (in most of the
cases, zero).
21tary information from di⁄erent internet sites, a complete panel of proprietary
drugs produced by the pharmaceuticals companies included in this study is
added to the resources described above. Medicines are divided into therapeu-
tic classes according to the ￿Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical￿classi￿cation
(ATC). The ATC provides four levels of classi￿cation. The ￿rst level (ATC
1) is the most general, with 14 anatomical groups and the fourth (ATC 4)
the most detailed, with more than 400 chemical/pharmacological subgroups.
To construct our measure of product relatedness, I will use the ATC 2 and
the ATC 3 classi￿cation.20
Finally, the most important mergers transactions among pharmaceutical
companies for the period 1988-2004 are obtained from The Mergers￿Year
Book published by Thomson Financial Service. To the best of my knowledge,
this paper is the ￿rst that uses a dataset that gathers ￿nancial variables,
patent statistics and product information.
Table 2A reports the number of mergers and acquisition over the period
1988 to 2004 together with the number of ￿rms in the sample used for this
study. Apart from year 1989, the wave of mergers between large pharma-
ceutical companies starts in 1994 and it extends to the end of the sample
period. Overall, there are 27 M&As considered in this study,21 whose de-
tails are reported in Table 2B. Despite the rather small size of the sample,
it must be kept in mind that this paper focuses on a well-de￿ned set of
20For instance, the ATC1 anatomical group ￿C￿ , cardiovascular system, is divided at
the second level in the following groups: cardiac therapy, antihypertensives, diuretics,
peripheral vasodilators, vasoprotectives, beta blocking agents, calcium channel blockers,
agents acting on the renin-agiotensin system and serum lipid reduction agents. Each of
these subgroups is further divided in more detailed sub-groups at the 3rd level.
21Note that, for the 3 operations taking place in year 2004, we can only assess the
￿immediate￿impact of the merger but not the e⁄ects in the following years.
22￿rms and operations: in this sense, this study includes the entire universe
of large pharmaceutical companies and the major transactions in which they
are involved. Moreover, the data used provide in-depth information on each
company, including also ￿ne indicators of technological and product relat-
edness. Table 2A reports also the average revenues, R&D expenditure and
number of patents over the sample period. Note that the average number
of patents obtained decreases considerably in the last years because of the
truncation problem: as we approach the last year of data, patent statistics
(computed according to the application date) will increasingly su⁄er from
the delay imposed by the review process.
INSERT TABLE 2A and 2B ABOUT HERE
Using the NBER patent data, including the patent citation ￿le, I con-
struct four di⁄erent measures of technological relatedness between acquirers
and targets: the correlation between patents￿technological classes (PCorr),
the overlap between the list of patents cited (Over) and the importance of
cross-citations from acquirers to targets (Cit) and viceversa (Spill). To test
the ￿positive assortive merging￿ hypothesis, these four variables are com-
puted not only for the true pair of acquirer and target, but also for all the
possible pairs that can be de￿ned by matching the actual acquirer with the
other ￿rms in the sample.22
22The idea is that these are the other ￿rms that the acquirer could have considered as
potential targets. For instance, in year 2004 the sample includes 33 ￿rms and 3 deals.
I then compute the 4 variables of technological relatedness between the ￿true￿acquirers
and targets (e.g. Sano￿ and Aventis). Moreover, I compute the same measures for the
acquirer and the other 32 possible targets (e.g. Sano￿ and Astrazeneca).
23Following Ja⁄e (1986), one could think that if there are K chemical areas
in which pharmaceutical ￿rms can do research, the ￿technological position￿
of a ￿rm￿ s research program can be de￿ned by a vector S=(S1;:::; SK), where
Sk is the fraction of patents in area k. As there are only 14 patent classes
in the technological category ￿Drugs and Medical￿ , it would be di¢ cult to
characterize properly the vector S. I then use the ￿ner classi￿cation based
on patent sub-classes.23 Each sub-class comprises compounds with similar
chemical structure so that each ￿rm is given a place in the space of chemical
entities. The correlation between the research programs of acquirer ￿ and
(actual or potential) target ￿ is de￿ned by:
PCorr =
P
k S￿k ￿ S￿k pP
k(S￿k)2 ￿ (S￿k)2: (9)
Alternative measures of the proximity between the research activities of
the ￿rms can be computed using the patent citations data. Let P￿ (P￿) and
B￿(B￿) be, respectively, the sets of patents owned and cited by the acquirer
(target). The variable Over is computed by looking at the overlap between
the set of patents cited by the acquirer and the selected target (see Marco
and Rausser, 2003):
Over =
(Number of Pat in B￿ \ B￿)
(Number of Pat in B￿)
;
where ￿rm ￿ is the acquirer while ￿rm ￿ is either the actual target or one of
the ￿ctional targets that are matched to ￿.
23Although there are more than 3000 sub-classes in the category ￿Drugs and Medical￿ ,
I recoded them in order to get a more tractable classi￿cation of about 200 sub-classes.
24The variable Cit computes the percentage of patents owned by the (actual
or ￿ctional) target ￿ that are cited by the acquirer ￿:
Cit =
(Number of Pat in B￿ \ P￿)
(Number of Pat in P￿)
:
On the contrary, the variable Spill measures the number of the acquirer￿ s
patents that are cited by the target ￿rm (normalized by the total number of
target￿ s citations) and it can be interpreted as a measure of the knowledge
that spill from the acquirer over to the target:
Spill =
(Number of Pat in P￿ \ B￿)
(Number of Pat in B￿)
:
The last two variables, Cit and Spill, are de￿ned using cross-citations data
and they measure direct linkages between ￿rms rather than placing them in
a certain technology space.24
As for product relatedness, I construct two measures of correlation be-
tween the acquirer and the (actual or potential) target, using a modi￿ed
version of equation (9) where the vector S=(S1;:::; SK) lists the fraction
of medicines in the therapeutic area k, according to the categories of the
ATC 2 and ATC 3. These two variables are labelled AT2Corr and AT3Corr,
respectively.
24Two things need to be noticed. First, the four variables have been computed using all
the patents owned by the ￿rms (not only ￿important￿patents), given that any patent is
useful to de￿ne the ￿technological￿position of the ￿rm. Second, the normalization of the
variables Over, Cit and Spill is always done with respect to the patent statistics of the
actual or potential target, in order to take into account the size of the target in terms of
patents holdings.
25Table 3A provides descriptive statistics and correlations of the six mea-
sures of technological and product relatedness described above. The table
shows that these variables di⁄er from each other and, interestingly enough,
are characterized by a low correlation, the only exception being the pair
AT2Corr and AT3Corr.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
4 Results
This section discusses the empirical results concerning the e⁄ects of M&As
on the innovation activity of merged ￿rms, and the ex-ante technological and
product relatedness of acquirers and targets.
Table 4 shows the results of two di⁄erent tests of the ￿positive assortive
merging￿hypothesis. The ￿rst is a simple t-test of the hypothesis that the 6
variables of relatedness de￿ned above have the same mean between the group
of true merged pairs and the group of ￿ctional pairs. The second test is the
van der Waerden X-test (Waerden, 1965). This consists of ranking the values
of each measure of relatedness and testing whether the rank of actual pairs
is statistically higher than the average rank of the ￿ctional pairs.25 In all the
25This is a nonparametric rank test, thus there is no hypothesis for the underlying
distribution of the observations. The null hypothesis is that the observations in the two
groups are drawn from the same distribution to test against the hypothesis of a ￿location
alternative￿ . This test is very close in spirit to the well-known ￿Wilcoxon￿rank test (also
known as Mann-Whitney-U-Test). The advantage of the X-test is a higher asymptotic
e¢ ciency. Moreover, ￿Wilcoxon￿test requires more than 3 observations per group (which
is not satis￿ed in our case since we compare the unique observation of the actual pair of
merging ￿rms against several arbitrary pairs).
26cases, the two tests reject the null hypothesis that the computed measures of
relatedness (or their corresponding ranks) have the same means within the
two groups. This gives strong support to the hypothesis that acquirers tend
to choose targets with similar research programs and product portfolio.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Table 5, Panel I, shows the e⁄ects of mergers on di⁄erent aspects of ￿rms￿
research activity, estimated using equation (5). Research inputs (R&D) and
outputs (P and Pimp) are found to decline in the same year and all the years
after the deals. Mergers have a negative e⁄ect on the R&D intensity too:
although none of the coe¢ cients is statistically signi￿cant, the hypothesis
that the sum of these coe¢ cients is not statistically di⁄erent from zero has
be rejected (p-value 0.078). The reorganization of the merged entities im-
plies a reduction in R&D investments that is above the reported decrease in
revenues. As for the research productivity, measured by the ratio of patents
and R&D expenditures (P/R&D) and (Pimp/R&D), most of the estimated
coe¢ cients have a negative sign, although they are not precisely estimated.
Finally, the prevalence of negative coe¢ cients in the last column of the table
suggests that mergers have on average a negative impact on ￿rms￿perfor-
mance.26 Although there is not a (statistically) signi￿cant reduction of the
26It might be the case that the merging ￿rms￿market value in t-1 already discounts the
possibility that these ￿rms decide to merge. I then use the average market value in t-1
and t-2 to soften the problem. This alternative approach gives similar results to those
presented in Table 5. Moreover, it must noticed that the estimated e⁄ects of mergers on
market value in the following three years are not a⁄ected by this problem.
27variable V in any of the years considered, overall returns for shareholders af-
ter the merger are clearly below those of other pharmaceutical ￿rms (p-value
0.064).27
To determine the e⁄ects of a merger, it is necessary to predict what
the performance of the merging ￿rms would have been in the absence of the
merger. In Table 5, this counterfactual is computed using the entire sample of
non merging ￿rms as ￿control￿group. A recognized weakness of this method
is that, in many studies, only a few ￿rms in the control group are comparable
to merged ￿rms. This issue is explored at length in the Appendix.
The rest of Table 5 analyses the relationship between the e⁄ects of merg-
ers and the similarities of merged parties, as speci￿ed in equation (6) above.
The measures of technological and product relatedness used are the patent
correlation, PCorr, and the drug therapeutic equivalence according to the
ATC2, AT2Corr, respectively. Panel II shows that the greater is the techno-
logical relatedness of the merged parties, the worse the e⁄ects of mergers on
R&D inputs and outputs are. This ￿nding is con￿rmed when the outcome
considered is the research productivity, as measured by (Pimp/R&D) or the
market expectation about the ￿rms￿future performance (V). In Panel III,
I estimate the simultaneous impact of technological and product relatedness
on the di⁄erent ￿rms￿outcomes already discussed. As expected, technologi-
cal relatedness has a greater impact on innovation than product relatedness.
Once technology is taken into account, similarities in the product portfolio
27An article recently appeared on the Wall Street Journal (￿The big drug mergers can be
hard to swallow￿ , April 1st 2004) points out that the stocks of pharmaceutical companies
that have merged over the past ￿ve years have lost on average 3.7% of their stock-market
value since their deals have been completed, compared with stocks in the Standard &
Poor￿ s pharmaceuticals index, which have risen by 7.2% on average.
28have generally little explanatory power for the post-merger e⁄ects. The only
interesting exception concerns the stock market value. While there is a neg-
ative correlation between PCorr and V, I ￿nd that companies with closer
product portfolios have more prominent increases of their stock market val-
ues. This con￿rms the assumption that @Vi=@PR > 0. As advanced in
Section 3, one possible explanation of this ￿nding is that the increase in en-
terprise values mirrors the increase in market power accruing to the merged
parties with similar drugs (Duso, Neven and Roller, 2003).
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
These ￿ndings already cast some serious doubts on the potential innova-
tion synergies that can be realized within mergers. Estimation of equation
(7) above can shed some further light on this issue. If M&As actually improve
the knowledge of merged ￿rms because each party learns something about
the others￿experience, major therapeutic breakthroughs are more likely to be
the outcome of the combined past research activities of acquirers and targets.
The results in Table 6 do not seem to support this hypothesis. Discoveries
that rely on the past experience of acquirers and targets (alone) are less im-
portant than those innovations without a direct link to their prior patents.
At the same time, patents that rely on past research of both acquirers and
targets are not more important.
Finally, estimation of equation (8) can help us to understand whether
mergers reduce the innovation incentives of competing ￿rms. As suggested in
Section 2, the maintained hypothesis is that mergers may deter other phar-
maceutical companies from pursuing further research in those ￿elds where
29both acquirers and targets are active players. Figures in Table 7 seems to
support this hypothesis. Patents that are cited by both the acquirer and
the target received fewer citations than other patents after the deal between
the two parties is closed. Competing ￿rms seem then discouraged to de-
velop new compounds in those chemical areas where the merged parties have
overlapping activities.28
INSERT TABLE 6 and 7 ABOUT HERE
5 Conclusions
This paper explores the e⁄ects of mergers on innovation in the pharmaceutical
industry. Consolidations among large pharmaceutical companies are found
to have a negative impact on ￿rms￿innovative performance, possibly because
of the post-merger dissipation of human capital and integration problems.
As for other studies, the di¢ culty of de￿ning a correct counterfactual
would suggest extreme caution in drawing conclusions for competition policy
purposes. However, alternative evidence based on patent citation data seems
to con￿rm that there are no knowledge synergies delivered by these opera-
tions. In addition, mergers are found to discourage third parties￿research in
those therapeutic areas where acquirers and targets are active players, thus
raising the suspects that these operations can harm innovation competition.
28This ￿nding is consistent with third parties￿allegation that mergers ￿would discourage
any tentative research and development attempts by third parties ...and that a new but
substantially smaller player would have di¢ culties in penetrating the market￿- EU merger
case No. COMP/M.1846 - Glaxo Wellcome / Smithkline Beecham (par. 96).
30Although these ￿ndings suggest that on average, mergers do not deliver
any innovation e¢ ciency, we have to keep in mind that there is no such a
thing as an ￿average merger￿ . To this aim, this paper advances our un-
derstanding of the e⁄ects of mergers by analysing the relationship between
ex-ante similarities of acquirers and targets and the post-merger performance.
This further step of the analysis raises another important concern. A higher
level of technological relatedness between merged parties is associated with
poorer innovation performances. That is, the operations that are more likely
to raise anti-competitive concerns, are exactly those that seem to deliver less
e¢ ciency gains. As the reduction of R&D personnel is likely to be positive
related to the merging ￿rms￿technological relatedness, human capital loses
may be the cause of this interesting ￿nding.
Beyond the contingent implication that technological relatedness can have
for mergers in the pharmaceutical industry, this paper clearly shows that the
analysis of the ex-ante similarities of merging parties might be helpful to shed
lights on the e⁄ects of mergers on e¢ ciency, market power and innovation
performances. Partners￿relatedness can possible explain why some mergers
are a failure and others a success. Given the paucity of empirical work on this
issue, it is then desirable to extend the present analysis to other industries
and countries.
Appendix
Results of Table 5 - Panel I can be interpreted as the e⁄ects of mergers
on innovation only under the assumption that in the absence of the consol-
idation, merged parties would perform as the control group of non-merging
￿rms. The aim of this Appendix is to explore whether there are true causal
31e⁄ects of mergers on innovation or whether the results are driven by an in-
correct sample selection to model the counterfactual outcome.
To understand the nature of the problem is useful to estimate equation (5)
for revenues, R, and number of employees, E. Table A1 shows that there is a
sensible reduction in the revenues and the labour force of merged companies
compared to the control group. In this case, it is not possible to a¢ rm
that these outcomes are caused by mergers. The work of Danzon et al., 2004
shows in fact that mergers among large ￿rms are a response to excess capacity
due to anticipated patent expirations. This means that merged companies
would experience a sensible reduction in their sales and in turn, a cut of their
employees even in the absence of the merger.
By the same talk, the suggested causal relationship between mergers and
innovation is undermined if merged entities anticipate a deterioration of their
innovation performances, perhaps because of recent research failures. But
this thesis is harder to defend. The stochastic nature of the research activity
implies that the future outcomes are di¢ cult to predict. Moreover, statistics
in Table A2 below show that there are no ex-ante signi￿cant di⁄erences in
the R&D intensity and innovation productivity (Patents/R&D) of acquirers
or targets and the control group. The only statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence
is that acquirers are larger than non-merging ￿rms.
Table A2 con￿rms that the sample used in the present work is rather
homogenous. Nevertheless, I check the robustness of the estimates when
covariates are added to equation (5) to control for any remaining heterogene-
ity between ￿rms. Speci￿cally, I use each of three main ￿nancial variables
available in this study (research expenditure, R&D, revenues, R, and market
32value, V) and di⁄erent combinations of them. The coe¢ cients reported in
Table A3 below are estimated adding the market-value sales ratio, V/R, as
control for ex-ante heterogeneity. Results with the other variables are sub-
stantially similar. The choice of V is due to the fact that the pre-merger
market value should encompasses the expected performance of the ￿rms in
the absence of the merger. So, any pre-merger di⁄erences between ￿rms
should be captured by this variable. At the same time, by normalizing the
market value for products sales, more emphasis is given to the ￿rm value
accruing from compounds under investigation. This covariate can be useful
to partial out unobservable di⁄erences in innovation across ￿rms prior to the
merger.
Despite this approach implies a reduction in the number of observations
available for estimation, Table A3 con￿rms the main ￿ndings in Panel I of
Table 5: a strong reduction in R&D expenditures and a decrease in both
research outputs and market value.
INSERT TABLE A1, A2 and A3 ABOUT HERE
Two ￿nal points are worth stressing. First, compared to other studies
aimed at assessing the e⁄ects of an economic ￿treatment￿(for instance, ef-
fects of a training program on unemployment), mergers have the peculiarity
that two units (acquirers and targets) are involved in the process. Therefore,
a control group selected on the base of acquirers￿ax-ante characteristics will
always be fallacious. Second, the correct assessment of the counterfactual
relies on the assumption that the ￿treatment￿applied to one unit do not af-
fect the outcome of another unit (the so-called ￿stable unit treatment value
33assumption￿ ). It is clear that this assumption is unlikely to hold in the case
of large merges. Despite I acknowledge the importance of these issues, it is
beyond the scope of this paper to provide a solution to them.
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38Table 1: Sample Statistics for Main Variables 
 
Variable Description  Variable 
Name 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Revenues, $million  R  5,595 5,802 
  Δ%R  0.068 0.134 
      
Firm market value, $million  V  24,725 33,971 
  Δ%V  0.098 0.331 
      
Total R&D expenditures, $million  R&D  703 782 
  Δ%R&D  0.094 0.154 
      
R&D intensity, (R&D/Revenues)  R&Dint  0.13 0.05 
  ΔR&Dint  0.003 0.015 
      
Employment, thousands  E  31.6 28.7 
  Δ%E  0.026 0.143 
      
Number of new patents  P  48.8 56.1 
  Δ%P  -0.133 0.765 
      
Number of new important patents   P
imp  12.7 13.8 
  Δ%P
imp  -0.113 0.737 
 
Notes: Δ% stands for growth rate, computed as logarithm differences between two consecutives years, 
while Δ indicates the simple difference between two consecutive years  
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 Table 2B: List of Mergers 
 
Acquirer Target  Year  Value 
($m) 
Bristol Myers  Squibb  1989  12,500 
Novo Nordisk 1989  - 
Smithkline Beckman  Beecham  1989  8,276 
American Home Product  Robins  1989  3,190 
American Home Product  Lederle (Amer. Cynamid)  1994  9,560 
Roche Syntex  1994  5,307 
Glaxo Wellcome  1995  14,284 
Pharmacia AB  Upjohn  1995  - 
Hoechst Marion  Roussel  1995  7,121 
Rhone Poulenc  Fisons  1995  2,888 
Ciba Sandoz 1996  27,000 
Amersham Nycomed  1997  - 
Roche Corange 1997  10,200 
Sanofi Synthelabo  1999  - 
Astra Zeneca  1999  34,636 
Hoechst Marion Roussel  Rhone Poulenc Rorer  2000  21,918 
Glaxo Wellcome  Smithkline Beecham  2000  76,000 
Pfizer Warner  Lambert  2000  87,413 
Pharmacia Upjohn  Searle (Monsanto)  2000  26,486 
Johnson & Johnson  Alza  2001  11,070 
Abbott Knoll  (Basf)  2001  6,900 
Bristol-Myers Squibb  Du Pont pharmaceuticals  2001  7,800 
Pfizer Pharmacia  2002  59,515 
Amgen Immunex 2002  16,900 
Sanofi-Synthelabo Aventis  2004  65,000 
Yamanouchi Fujisawa  2004  7,700 
UCB Celltech  2004  2,250 
 
Notes: This is the complete list of M&As reported in Table 1A. Ciba and Sandoz join together in 1996 to 
form Novartis. The merger between Hoechst Marion Roussel and Rhone Poulenc Rorer in 2000 leads to 
the creation of Aventis. Finally, Astella is the resulting company from the merger between Yamanouchi 
and Fujisawa.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3: Technological and Product Similarities 
(Means and Correlations of Variables) 
 
  Mean  1 2 3 4 5 6 
PCorr  0.221 
(0.295) 
1        
Over  0.032 
(0.058) 
0.268 
(0.221) 
1       
Cit  0.023 
(0.043) 
0.149 
(0.369) 
0.619 
(0.782) 
1 
 
   
Spill  0.007 
(0.011) 
0.213 
(0.202) 
0.627 
(0.549) 
0.225 
(0.587) 
1    
AT2Corr  0.167 
(0.255) 
0.315 
(-0.140) 
0.061 
(-0.213) 
0.091 
(-0.037)
0.027 
(-0.146) 
1  
AT3Corr  0.088 
(0.129) 
0.334 
(0.105) 
0.092 
(-0.126) 
0.138 
(0.174) 
0.078 
(0.018) 
0.780 
(0.828) 
1 
Notes: In parenthesis, means and correlations of the variables for the “true” merged pairs. 
 
 
Table 4: Technological and Product Similarities  
(Test of Differences between “True” and “Fictional” Pairs) 
 
Variable  t-test statistics 
a  X-test statistics
 b 
PCorr  -2.92 -4.03 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Over  -3.57 -3.91 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Cit  -1.85 -2.87 
  (0.03) (0.00) 
Spill  -1.73 -2.92 
  (0.04) (0.00) 
AT2Corr  -2.80 -2.59 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
AT3Corr  -2.02 -1.94 
  (0.02) (0.03) 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis 
a t-test of the difference between mean values; the null hypothesis is that the mean of the variable for the 
“true” merged pairs is equal to the mean of the variable for the “fictional” pairs. The alternative 
hypothesis is that the mean for the “true” pairs is lower (one-tail test). 
b The X-test statistics is distributed as N(0,1). The null hypothesis is that the rankings of “true” merging 
pairs is equal to the ranking of “fictional” pairs. The alternative hypothesis is that the mean for the “true” 
pairs is lower (one-tail test).  
Table 5: Effects of M&As 
 
Panel I 
Dependent 
Variable: 
 
Δ%R&D 
 
ΔR&Dint 
 
Δ%P 
 
Δ%P
imp  ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
R&D
P
Δ%
 
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
R&D
P
Δ%
imp
 
 
Δ%V 
Merged in t   -0.051**  -0.005  -0.167*  -0.308** -0.115  -0.348***  -0.025 
 (0.023)  (0.003)  (0.092)  (0.140)  (0.102) (0.125) (0.074) 
Merged in t-1  -0.038*  -0.001 0.064 0.039 0.087  0.044  -0.076 
 (0.023)  (0.003)  (0.151)  (0.072)  (0.153) (0.078) (0.051) 
Merged in t-2  -0.060***  -0.003 -0.128 -0.081 -0.051  0.033  -0.066 
 (0.018)  (0.002)  (0.113)  (0.139)  (0.117) (0.143) (0.041) 
Merged in t-3 -0.076***  -0.002  -0.31*** -0.212** -0.261**  -0.134  -0.046 
 (0.025)  (0.003)  (0.117)  (0.095)  (0.120) (0.090) (0.037) 
P-value 
a  0.000  0.078 0.037 0.025 0.203  0.100  0.064 
N. of  Obs.  640  632  694  617  520  445  495 
            
Panel II 
Dependent 
Variable: 
 
Δ%R&D 
 
ΔR&Dint 
 
Δ%P 
 
Δ%P
imp  ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
R&D
P
Δ%
 
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
R&D
P
Δ%
imp
 
 
Δ%V 
PCorrt-1    -0.152**  -0.017* -0.71*** -1.05*** -0.546** -1.09*** 0.014 
 (0.062)  (0.010)  (0.227)  (0.399)  (0.262) (0.425) (0.219) 
PCorrt-2  -0.129***  -0.004 0.328 0.061 0.392  0.080  -0.247** 
 (0.049)  (0.006)  (0.441)  (0.199)  (0.443) (0.204) (0.107) 
PCorrt-3  -0.187***  -0.013**  -0.454 -0.791 -0.231  -0.440  -0.258* 
 (0.043)  (0.007)  (0.348)  (0.532)  (0.374) (0.601) (0.139) 
PCorrt-4  -0.222***  -0.004 -0.646 -0.614 -0.532  -0.366  -0.162 
 (0.068)  (0.010)  (0.441)  (0.397)  (0.443) (0.359) (0.130) 
P-value 
a  0.000  0.031 0.059 0.006 0.259  0.050  0.038 
N. of  Obs  640  632  694  617  520  445  495 
  
Table 5 (Continued) 
 
Panel III 
Dependent 
Variable: 
 
Δ%R&D 
 
ΔR&D int 
 
Δ%P 
 
Δ%P
imp  ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
R&D
P
Δ%
 
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
R&D
P
Δ%
imp
 
 
Δ%V 
PCorrt-1 -0.169*  -0.033***  -0.75*** -1.374** -0.539*  -0.613  -0.338 
 (0.087)  (0.011)  (0.269)  (0.549)  (0.319) (0.410) (0.327) 
PCorrt-2  -0.161**  -0.009 0.481  -0.119  0.596  -0.042 -0.369*** 
 (0.069)  (0.008)  (0.523)  (0.268)  (0.513) (0.204) (0.109) 
PCorrt-3 -0.215***  -0.016**  -0.807*  -1.306** -0.619  -1.008*  -0.275 
 (0.054)  (0.007)  (0.470)  (0.512)  (0.510) (0.579) (0.193) 
PCorrt-4  -0.144**  0.006 -0.023  -0.111  0.072 0.038 -0.272* 
 (0.071)  (0.012)  (0.325)  (0.452)  (0.351) (0.415) (0.158) 
AT2Corrt-1   0.029  0.032***  0.148 0.524 0.096  -1.103**  0.445 
 (0.151)  (0.010)  (0.201)  (0.829)  (0.439) (0.485) (0.308) 
AT2Corrt-2  0.047 0.009 -0.393  0.220  -0.484  0.096 0.273** 
 (0.086)  (0.011)  (0.695)  (0.144)  (0.586) (0.231) (0.105) 
AT2Corrt-3  0.059 0.004 0.471  0.77***  0.552 0.879***  0.077 
 (0.081)  (0.008)  (0.394)  (0.273)  (0.376) (0.311) (0.169) 
AT2Corrt-4  -0.103 -0.017 -0.793  -0.420** -0.773 -0.305*  0.135 
 (0.098)  (0.011)  (0.525)  (0.203)  (0.554) (0.172) (0.088) 
P-value
 b  0.000 0.010 0.190  0.002  0.577 0.073 0.001 
P-value 
c  0.877 0.161 0.556  0.220  0.515 0.483 0.009 
N. of Obs.   633  625  689  612  515  440  489 
 
Notes:  Robust standard error in parentheses. Time dummies are included in all the regressions. The variables PCorr 
and AT2Corr are computed using patent and product data of acquirers and targets in the year before the merger (e.g. 
for a deal signed in 1995, the two variables are computed with data of 1994). These two variables take a value of zero 
for non-merging firms. The compute innovation output and productivity, a patent is added to the original number of 
patents so that that ln(patent)=0 when patent=0. 
*** = significant at 1% level;   ** = significant at 5% level;   * = significant at 10% level 
a P-values of the Wald-test of the null hypothesis that the sum of the 4 coefficients is statistically different from zero.  
b P-values of the Wald-test of the null hypothesis that the sum of the first 4 coefficients (i.e. those concerning PCorr) is 
statistically different from zero.  
c P-values of the Wald-test of the null hypothesis that the sum of the last 4 coefficients (i.e. those concerning AT2Corr) 
is statistically different from zero.  Table 6: Mergers and Synergies 
  
Dependent Variable:
 
Number of Citations Received 
by any patent j granted to the acquirer 
within 5 after the merger 
  
Patent j cites patents of 
Acquirer (only) 
-0.248*** 
(0.088) 
Patent j cites patents of 
Target (only) 
-0.509*** 
(0.066) 
Patent j cites patents of 
Acquirer and Target 
-0.001 
(0.592) 
  
Number of Obs.  6,500 
 
Notes:  Robust standard error in parentheses. Complete set of time dummies included.  
*** = significant at 1% level;   ** = significant at 5% level;   * = significant at 10% level 
 
 
Table 7: Effects of Mergers on Competing Firms 
  
Dependent Variable:
 
Number of Citations Received 
by any patent j granted to any firm in 
the last 5 years before the merger 
  
Patent j is cited by patents of 
Acquirer (only) 
-0.011 
(0.045) 
Patent j is cited by patents of 
Target (only) 
-0.017 
(0.069) 
Patent j is cited by patents of 
Acquirer and Target 
-0.140** 
(0.070) 
Number of Citations 
Received by patent j until t-1
0.017*** 
(0.002) 
  
Number of Obs.  12,662 
 
Notes:  Robust standard error in parentheses. Complete set of time dummies included.  
*** = significant at 1% level;   ** = significant at 5% level;   * = significant at 10% level.  
APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Revenues and Employment  
 
 Dependent Variable: Δ%R  Δ%E 
Merged in t   -0.016  -0.039 
 (0.018)  (0.028) 
Merged in t-1 -0.032  -0.083*** 
 (0.026)  (0.027) 
Merged in t-2 -0.042***  -0.075*** 
 (0.015)  (0.019) 
Merged in t-3 -0.064***  -0.036** 
 (0.017)  (0.014) 
P-value 
a  0.000 0.000 
Number of Obs.  638  538 
Notes:  Robust standard error in parentheses. Time dummies are included in all the regressions. 
*** = significant at 1% level;   ** = significant at 5% level;   * = significant at 10% level 
a P-values of the Wald-test of the null hypothesis that the sum of the 4 coefficients is statistically different 
from zero.  
 
Table A2: Ex-ante Differences between Merging and Non-merging Firms  
 
Variable  Mean for 
Acquirers/Target 
Mean for 
control group 
P-value 
(diff. in means) 
ln (Stock Market Value)  10.4  9.02  0.00 
in millions of $  9.25  9.08  0.53 
      
ln (R&D expenditure)  6.77  5.91  0.00 
in millions of $  6.00  6.03  0.91 
      
R&D intensity  0.134  0.130  0.68 
 0.139  0.130  0.43 
      
ln(Patents) 4.05  2.99  0.00 
 3.55  3.02  0.14 
      
Patent / R&D exp.   0.09  0.13  0.38 
 0.11  0.13  0.75 
Notes:  The first line refers to the mean for acquirers while the second line to the mean for targets. The 
mean value for acquirers and targets is computed one year before the merger. The control group for 
acquirer (target) is formed by all those firms that do not acquire another firm (are not acquired by another 
firm) in any of the following three years.  
  
Table A3: Effects of M&As controlling for Heterogeneity 
 
Panel I 
Dependent 
Variable: 
 
Δ%R&D 
 
Δ%P 
 
Δ%P
imp  ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
R&D
P
Δ%  
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
R&D
P
Δ%
imp
 
 
Δ%V 
Merged in t    -0.071*** -0.108  -0.468*** -0.020  -0.396*** -0.021 
 (0.026)  (0.100)  (0.136)  (0.105) (0.141) (0.074) 
Merged in t-1  -0.051**  -0.000  0.011 0.062 0.071 -0.063 
 (0.024)  (0.178)  (0.119)  (0.179) (0.128) (0.053) 
Merged in t-2  -0.068***  -0.190 -0.159 -0.126 -0.044 -0.056 
 (0.024)  (0.145)  (0.215)  (0.150) (0.202) (0.048) 
Merged in t-3  -0.096*** -0.443*** -0.351*** -0.386**  -0.249**  -0.051 
 (0.031)  (0.147)  (0.106)  (0.160) (0.107) (0.021) 
Control: V/R 0.045***  -0.011 -0.026 -0.042 -0.054 -0.031 
 (0.009)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.035) (0.038) (0.021) 
P-value 
a  0.000 0.018 0.001 0.145 0.041 0.108 
N.  of  Obs. 483 391 325 381 316 473 
Notes:  Robust Standard Error in parentheses. Time dummies included in all the regressions.  
*** = significant at 1% level;   ** = significant at 5% level;   * = significant at 10% level 
a P-values of the Wald-test of the null hypothesis that the sum of the 4 coefficients is statistically different 
from zero.  
 